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A UNITARY ASEAN PATENT LAW IN THE AFTERMATH
OF TRIPS
Christian H. Nguyen
Abstract: Members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN")
have come to recognize that rigorous protection for industrial and technological
innovations is essential to the economic viability of the Southeast Asian region. This
recognition has heightened since the inception of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs"). TRIPs imposes minimum standards
for patent protection upon signatories to the World Trade Organization, which includes
most of the ASEAN member countries. Strict compliance with TRIPs standards can
severely aggravate the administrative deficiencies in national patent systems, but such
deficiencies can be considerably alleviated with the institution of a regional patent
scheme for the administration of patents. In addition to the definite advantages that an
ASEAN Patent Office will present for individual countries, the ASEAN members can
also ensure patent owners optimum patent protection only with the adoption of uniform
post-grant enforcement procedures. In the absence of such procedures, patents granted in
either the national ASEAN offices or the regional office would be accorded inadequate
protection in light of existing weak enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property
rights. These weaknesses are exacerbated by cultural and political norms unfavorable to
national efforts at heightened protection. Accordingly, a unitary ASEAN patent law is
indispensable if the ASEAN countries are to maintain internationally competitive markets
and achieve vigorous economic development.
I. INTRODUCTION
Southeast Asia has undergone rapid dynamic economic development
since the inception of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
("ASEAN"), but inadequate protection accorded patent owners in ASEAN
countries has curtailed further growth in the region.' In order to participate
in international trade and to maintain globally competitive markets, the
ASEAN countries must adhere to multi-national treaties which address
intellectual property ("IP") matters, particularly the recently adopted Trade-
With ten member countries, ASEAN is the leading economic and political organization in the
Southeast Asian region. It was founded in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the
Philippines in an effort to expand regional cooperation in various business sectors. COMMERCIAL LAWS
OF EAST ASIA 3 (Alan Gutterman & Robert Brown eds., 1997). It was later joined by Brunei Darussalam.
in 1984 and Vietnam in 1995. Chia Siow Yue & Joseph L. H. Tan, An Overview of ASEAN in the WTO:
Challenges and Responses, in ASEAN IN THE WTO: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 1 (Chia Siow Yue
& Joseph L. H. Tan eds., 1996). The most recent members to become parties to ASEAN are Laos and
Myanmar in 1997 and Cambodia in 1998. ASEAN, History and Evolution of ASEAN (visited Mar. 10,
1999) <http://www.asean.or.id/history/asn-his2.htm>.
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Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs").2 The TRIPs
Agreement imposes minimum standards of patent protection upon signatory
members, and reinforces multi-lateral cooperation to harmonize patent laws.
National efforts by many of the ASEAN members to reform the
administrative procedures and infrastructures of existing local patent systems
have been substantial, but this Comment argues that regional cooperation
would better facilitate compliance with international standards implied under
TRIPs. Indeed, the ASEAN nations have taken affirmative measures toward
extensive cooperative efforts that members anticipate will culminate in the
creation of a regional ASEAN Patent Office.3 As in any patent system, the
ultimate goal that ASEAN members envision for the regional office is greater
protection for industrial and technological innovations.4 The advantages of
establishing a regional office in Southeast Asia for the administration of
patents are significant as demonstrated by the successes of existing regional
patent offices world-wide such as the European Patent Convention ("EPC").5
Particularly, an ASEAN Patent Office would arguably alleviate the enormous
and ongoing administrative burdens which ASEAN nations encounter in their
struggle to comply with international standards. Moreover, a regional scheme
for the administration of patents enforceable in all ASEAN countries would
ultimately bring the members closer to conformance with the TRIPs
Agreement.
An ASEAN Patent Office would be ineffective, however, without the
harmonization of post-grant enforcement procedures. The legal frameworks
for enforcing intellectual property rights in many of the ASEAN countries
are considerably deficient. In addition to outdated administrative and
judicial infrastructures, weak enforcement is attributable in large part to
political and cultural attitudes and norms that are unfavorable to the
establishment of effective enforcement mechanisms.6 Thus, in the absence
of uniform enforcement measures, a patent granted through an ASEAN
regional patent office would not be afforded the optimum level of protection
within ASEAN member countries.
2 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organizations, Annex IC, Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31,
33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement].
See ASEAN Framework Agreement on Intellectual Property Cooperation, Dec. 15, 1995,
available in ASEANHomepage (visited Nov. 9, 1998) <http://www.asean.or.id/ECONOMIC/eco-ipr.htm>
[hereinafter Framework Agreement].
4 See id.
See Gerald J. Mossinghoff& Vivian S. Kuo, World Patent System Circa 20XXA.D., 80 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 523, 534-40 (1998) (discussing regional patent systems).6 See infra Part VI.C.
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This Comment continues in Part II by discussing the importance of
heightened protection of intellectual property rights to the ASEAN
economies. Part III summarizes the multi-national developments that have
reinforced international cooperation in the intellectual property arena and
served as the stepping stone for the creation of the TRIPs Agreement. The
principal TRIPs patent provisions are also highlighted. Part IV generally
discusses the reforms to intellectual property systems that were adopted by
ASEAN countries subsequent to the conception of TRIPs. This Comment
explores in Part V the deficiencies inherent in existing national patent
systems-lack of expertise, inadequate funding, and inefficient
processing-which hinder optimal compliance with TRIPs. It further
discusses the prospect of an ASEAN Patent Office as a favorable alternative
to the existing scheme for patent administration. Part VI illustrates that,
given the potential advantages of a regional patent office to ASEAN nations,
the member countries should commit to establishing an ASEAN Patent
Office in the near future. This Comment further proposes that ASEAN go
beyond the existing regional patent arrangements to establish a unitary
patent law and an ASEAN court to oversee patent infringement claims.
Such a centralized scheme would ensure that potential and existing patent
owners have sufficient protection against encroachment of their rights.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE RISING IMPORTANCE OF PATENT PROTECTION
TO ASEAN COUNTRIES
Despite their geographical proximity, the ten members of ASEAN have
developed distinct approaches to intellectual property law.7 Because of the
striking diversity in colonial history and economic and political culture among
the countries, the extent to which the individual members have become
integrated into global economic politics varies greatly! Some countries have a
longer,9 hence, stronger, history of intellectual property protection than
others.10 All members of ASEAN, nevertheless, have in recent years been
faced with the clear reality that more rigorous protection for intellectual
7 See generally INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA (Alan Gutterman & Robert
Brown eds., 1997).
See generally COMMERCIAL LAWS OF EAST ASIA, supra note 1.
Geoffrey Yu, Issues in the Protection ofIntellectual Property Rights in ASEAN: An International
Perspective, in ASEAN IN THE WTO: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES, supra note 1, at 71, 73.
0 S. Tiwari, Intellectual Property Rights: An ASEAN Perspective, in ASEAN IN THE WTO:
CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES, supra note 1, at 98, 105.
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property rights ("IPRs") means the potential for greater economic
development."
A. Recognition of lP Protection as Integral to Economic Development
For the most part, the ASEAN countries wavered for many years as to
whether reforms to national intellectual property laws should be a priority."
This state of reservation dates back to 1990.13 The potential economic return
for investments in IP development was not always fully recognized.
Moreover, ASEAN leaders viewed intellectual property cooperation as
undermining domestic legal systems, and perpetuating economic, scientific,
and technological disparities amongst themselves, 4 and with respect to
developed countries. 5 In recent years, however, ASEAN countries have
begun to share the common revelation that intellectual property protection is
essential to economic advancement. 6 This realization has been due in large
part to the inclusion of intellectual property issues in international trade
negotiations, specifically the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), 7 which engendered the TRIPs Agreement.'"
Participants in the Uruguay Round addressed the potential benefits of
intellectual property protection for both developed and developing
countries.' Greater protection provides incentives for investments in
Id. See infra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
2 Yu, supra note 9, at 76. See also Mustappa Sirat, Intellectual Property Cooperation Among
Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN: Present Status and Future Plans, INTELL. PROP. ASIA &
PAC.: Q.J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., Apr.-June 1997, at 36, 37 (paper presented at the WIPO-
ASEAN Sub-Regional Round Table on the Implications of the ASEAN Free Trade Area ("AFTA") on the
Intellectual Property System, May 9-10, 1997).
13 Id.
14 Id.
's Alan Gutterman & Robert Brown, Intellectual Property in the Global Marketplace, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA, supra note 7, at 16-18.
6 irat, supra note 12, at 37.
' Yu, supra note 9, at 76. See also COMMERCIAL LAWS OF EAST ASIA, supra note 1, at 45.
Cooperative efforts pursuant to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") in 1947 created a
comprehensive international trading system which eliminated much uncertainty in cross-border trades and
liberalized trading policies in post-World War II. The GATT system at its inception had two fundamental
functions: to establish a set of procedures governing countries' trade-related policies and to provide a forum
for multi-lateral negotiations and dispute resolutions. Richard Blackhurst, The Capacity of the WTO to
Fulfill Its Mandate, in THE WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 31, 44 (Anne 0. Krueger ed.,
1998).
" Several years of multi-lateral trade negotiations under GATT in the Uruguay Round in 1994
resulted in the conception of many important events, including the replacement of GATT functions by the
World Trade Organization ("WTO") and the execution of the TRIPs Agreement. Kevin C. Kennedy, The
GA TT-WTO System at Fifty, 16 WIS. INT'L L.J. 421, 443-44 (1998).
" Mossinghoff& Kuo, supra note 5, at 531-32.
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domestic technological and industrial research and development ("R & D")2"
which in turn stimulates economic progress. In addition, more stringent
protection may potentially result in an increase in foreign technology
transfers to developing markets.2 The number of patent applications, local
or foreign, in a particular country is indicative of that country's ability to
attract medium and long-term investments in technology.22 Additionally, the
number of patent applications from local companies, inventors, and R & D
institutions in a given country is evidence of domestic technological
advancement.23 The lack of scientific and financial resources has severely
limited domestic research and development in many developing countries.24
Consequently, some ASEAN countries, such as the Philippines, have begun
to rely on technology transfers for the introduction of innovative techniques
and technologies to spur and facilitate the production and manufacture of
new products in local markets.25
B. Commitment to Patent Law Reformation
As ASEAN nations recognized the importance of intellectual property
to Southeast Asia, their commitment to restructuring national patent law
systems intensified. ASEAN leaders anticipated that new laws and
administrative facilities would induce greater interest in intellectual property
and thus heighten the demand for patent protection in their countries.26
Indeed, the increase in the number of technology transfer arrangements has
been considerable for certain countries, most notably those that adopted
revisions to patent laws.27 With respect to applications from local inventors,
the numbers have not been quite so impressive. In fact, the ASEAN region
lags by comparison to not only industrialized countries, but also to those
with comparable economic standing in the Latin American region.28 Weak
20 Id. at 532.
21 Id.
21 Yu, supra note 9, at 77.
23 Id.
24 Gutterman & Brown, supra note 15, at 19.
23 Jacinto D. Jimenez, Philippines, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA, supra
note 7, at 267, 268.
26 Yu, supra note 9, at 76.
27 Since the implementation of Singapore's current Patent Act in February 1995, monthly patent
applications have more than doubled. Id. Moreover, from 1978 to 1993, a total of 1,504 technology
transfer arrangements were registered in the Philippines. The top five countries which had, during that
period, been the source of technology suppliers are United States 614; Japan 267; United Kingdom 98;
Switzerland 98; and Germany 75. In 1994, 135 technology transfer arrangements were registered in the
Philippines. Jimenez, supra note 25, at 269.
2 Yu, supra note 9, at 77.
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activity in the intellectual property arena within the ASEAN region,
therefore, is a legitimate concern for ASEAN leaders.
III. TRIPS: THE LEADING INITIATIVE ON GLOBAL HARMONIZATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION
A. Establishing a Framework for International Cooperation in
Intellectual Property
The creation of the Trade Related-Aspects of Intellectual Property
Agreement, enacted in 1994, has been a motivating factor behind the
extensive revamping of national policies for greater intellectual property
protection in Southeast Asia. The TRIPs Agreement sets minimum
standards of intellectual property protection for all members of the World
Trade Organization ("WTO"), of which most of the ASEAN countries are
currently members. Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar are the only
countries that are not members of the WTO.29 Before the TRIPs Agreement,
international standards were unsettled.
1. The Paris Convention
Global cooperation on IP matters did not initiate with the TRIPs
Agreement. Specific to the coverage on patent, the Agreement builds upon
the Paris Convention of 1884 ("Paris Convention"). 30 The Paris Convention
established the principles of "national treatment," "right of priority," and
"special agreements," which have been integrated in subsequent multi-
national patent treaties, including the TRIPs Agreement.3 As the first
29 Membership in the WTO now stands at 119. Twenty-eight countries, including China, Taiwan,
Russia, and Vietnam are seeking accession to the WTO. K. Kesavapany, An Overview of Recent
Developments in the WTO, in ASEAN IN THE WTO: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES, supra note 1, at 17,
25-26.
30 The founding members of the Paris Convention are Belgium, Brazil, France, Guatemala, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Salvador, Serbia, Spain, and Switzerland. Currently, the Paris Convention has 144
members, including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam. Beside patents, the
Convention also addresses trademarks, trade names, industrial designs, and unfair competition.
Mossinghoff& Kuo, supra note 5, at 526 & n. 10.
" According to the principle of "national treatment," all signatory members to the Convention must
afford nationals of other member countries the same rights and privileges which they provide to their own
nationals under their patent laws. The nationals of foreign member countries, however, are subject to the
domestic laws of the member country from which they seek patent protection. Id.
The "right of priority" entitles a patent application filed in one member country to an extended period
of 12 months after the initial filing of the application to submit the application in any or all of the other
member countries. If any subsequent applications are filed by nationals of member countries during this
one-year period, the pertinent date is the earliest filing date. According to the "right of priority," patent
VOL. 8 No. 2
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crucial effort at international cooperation in the intellectual property arena,
the Paris Convention eliminated barriers obstructing the acquisition of
impartial cross-national patent protection, and promoted international
exchange of industrial and technological innovations. However, it did not
impose any substantive standards of patent law.32
2. The World Intellectual Property Organizations
The establishment of the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO") on July 14, 1967 pushed intellectual property protection to the
forefront of global focus.33  Membership in WIPO now stands at 171
countries, including the ASEAN countries except for Laos, Cambodia, and
Myanmar, the most recent ASEAN members.34 With the mission "to
promote the protection of intellectual property throughout the world,
' 35
WIPO has become the centralized international forum for the discussion of
intellectual property issues worldwide.36 In addition to promoting the
fundamental objectives and coordinating activities prescribed by the Paris
Convention, the organization is an essential source of legal and technical
assistance as well as financial guidance to developing countries 37 including
ASEAN countries, 38 on all matters relating to intellectual property.
Moreover, WIPO administers numerous international treaties on intellectual
owners who seek ultimately to obtain multi-national patent protection can: 1) avoid the threat of
intervening claims of prior art, which would otherwise prevent acquisition of a patent; 2) overcome the
novelty requirement; and 3) evaluate the economic viability of their inventions and determine whether
protection should be sought. Id. at 527.
The Paris Convention, moreover, provided a forum for the creation of "special agreements" to further
the dialogue and cooperation among member countries on intellectual property ("IP") matters consistent
with the provisions of the Convention. As a result, all subsequent multinational and regional patent
protection arrangements, including the TRIPs Agreement, conceived under the catalyst of the Convention
are considered "special agreements." Id.
32 Id.
3' The secretariat of the Paris Convention, the Bureux Internationalaux Reunis pour la Protection de
la Propriete Intellectuelle, became a specialized agency of the United Nations ("UN") under the title of the
World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO"). Id. at 528. As one of the 16 specialized agencies of
the UN system of organizations, the WIPO has its own constitution, member states, and secretariat. Yu,
supra note 9, at 72.
' A list of member countries can be found at WIPO, General Information about WIPO (visited Feb.
23, 1999) <http://www/wipo.org/eng/infbroch/infbro98.htm>.
35 Id.
36 Mossinghoff& Kuo, supra note 5, at 528.
37 Id. Robert Sherwood, The TRIPs Agreement: Implications for Developing Countries, 37 IDEA
491, 540-42 (1997).
31 Yu, supra note 9, at 82-83.
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propeity, notably the Patent Cooperation Treaty ("PCT") in the area of
patent protection.39
3. The Patent Cooperation Treaty
The Patent Cooperation Treaty, effective since 1978, implemented a
system for "rationalizing" the patent application procedure to reduce duplicate
application and examination within the signatory countries.' Of the ninety-
five member countries of the PCT, only three ASEAN countries are parties:
Singapore, Indonesia, and Vietnam.4 Submission of an application under this
international convention does not result in an issuance of an "international
patent, '" 2 nor does it necessarily guarantee patent protection in the designated
member countries. The PCT provides only a multi-national mechanism
through which an inventor may acquire protection in multiple PCT signatory
states by filing only one application in any of nine designated national
offices.43 These international searching authorities have been delegated to
perform a preliminary search and examination, and in most cases, an
examination of substance of patent applications filed under the PCT.' The
reports resulting from the examination of the application are then relied upon
by PCT members designated in the applications to determine, under their own
3' See WIPO, supra note 34.
4o Prior to the Patent Cooperation Treaty ("PCT"), in order to acquire patent protection, inventors
had to file an individual application with each country in which they wished to secure protection for their
inventions. Applicants inevitably incurred enormous costs associated with the acquisition procedure,
including translation costs and local attorney fees. The effort on the part of the United States during the
1960s to eliminate the duplication of patent applications and examinations resulted in the execution of the
Washington Treaty in 1970, which was later recognized as the PCT. Mossinghoff & Kuo, supra note 5, at529. 4 A list of members of the PCT can be found in INTELL. PROP. ASIA & PAC.: Q.J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. ORG., supra note 12, at 80.
42 Mossinghoff& Kuo, supra note 5, at 530.
4 An inventor seeking to file for patent protection through the PCT must first submit an
"international application" in any one of the following designated international searching authorities:
Australia, Austria, China, Japan, the Russian Confederation, Spain, Sweden, the United States, and the
European Patent Office. Sherwood, supra note 37, at 529. For as long as thirty months, an applicant may
designate on the patent application as many of the PCT signatory countries where the applicant wishes to
acquire protection. Mossinghoff& Kuo, supra note 5, at 529.
" Once a designated international authority receives an "international application," the office
conducts a preliminary examination as to the formal requirements of the application and a novelty search,
and completes an "International Search Report." Mossinghoff& Kuo, supra note 5, at 529. In the majority
of cases, applicants request an International Preliminary Examination, which is an examination of an
application for substance. A non-binding report is produced as to whether the invention "appears to be
novel, to involve an inventive step (to be non-obvious), and to be industrially applicable." Id. (quoting
Patent Cooperation Treaty of June 19, 1970, ch. II, art. 33, cl. 1, reprinted in SELECTED INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND UNFAIR COMPETITION STATUTES, REGULATIONS AND TREATIES 805 (Roger E.
Schecter ed., 1997)).
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national laws, whether to grant patent protection.4" By consolidating what had
previously been a laborious, multi-filing process for many inventors into a
single procedure, the Patent Cooperation Treaty has rendered the filing process
increasingly efficient.46 Shifting the burden of preliminary and substantive
examination upon the international authorities has alleviated considerable
administrative costs for PCT signatory members.47  This is especially
significant for the ASEAN countries, and presents an incentive for non-
signatory countries to pursue membership.4"
4. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement
The Paris Convention formed the crucial framework for subsequent
global cooperative efforts in intellectual property and the Patent Cooperation
Treaty harmonized the preliminary procedure for patent acquisition, but
substantial steps towards international harmonization of substantive patent
laws were not realized until the TRIPs Agreement.4 9 The Agreement
introduced a novel matter-intellectual property rights-into the ongoing
dialogue within GATT, which historically dealt strictly with trade-of-goods
issues." The inclusion of IPRs into GATT negotiations illustrates the
weight that intellectual property protection bears on international trade.5
The TRIPs Agreement proposes to standardize the creation,
protection, and enforcement of IPRs for all members and potential members,
thereby affecting WTO members in varying degrees. TRIPs provides
developed countries with minimum standards of procedural and substantive
s Once the International Search Report and an International Preliminary Examination have been
completed, the applicant enters a "national phase" and has the option of continuing submission of the
application to national offices where protection is sought. The national offices would then conduct an
examination under domestic laws in light of the PCT reports. Mossinghoff& Kuo, supra note 5, at 530.
1 Another major advantage to inventors in submitting an "international application" under the PCT
scheme is the delay in the moment when substantial costs for final examinations in each national IP office
are due. Such costs may include application fees, translation costs, and local agent fees. Sherwood, supra
note 37, at 530.
47 Id.
' Yu, supra note 9, at 72-73.
4' See infra notes 59-79 and accompanying text.
SO Kennedy, supra note 18, at 473.
s' The impetus for international enhancement of Intellectual Property Rights ("IPRs") protection
generated from certain industries, including the United States pharmaceutical industry, of developed
countries that relied upon the protection of their intellectual properties. Developed countries regarded
GATT as the most favorable forum in which to raise international recognition of IPRs and the
harmonization of national intellectual property systems since most intellectual property disputes involved
trade. Gutterman & Brown, supra note 15, at 12. Nonetheless, the provisions of the TRIPs Agreement
were intended to supplement existing international treaties administered by the WIPO. Id.
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protection for their nationals. 2 Simultaneously, it affords developing
countries a transition period during which they may amend and promulgate
national laws, and rebuild IP administrative infrastructures. 3 The deadline
for developed countries was January 1996, whereas developing countries
and countries in transition from centrally-planned to market economies have
until the years 2000 and 2005 respectively to implement the TRIPs
provisions.54 Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and
Myanmar are classified as developing countries, and Singapore is likely
deemed a developed country for the purpose of compliance with TRIPs.55
Vietnam is considered both a developing country and one in transition.56
Given the disparate levels of sophistication in current ASEAN national IP
systems, the ASEAN countries will encounter different challenges in their
efforts to satisfy the new standards. For the more developed members,
particularly Singapore, the direct benefits of the TRIPs Agreement are
imminent and the burdens may be minimal." For other member countries,
such as Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, successful compliance with
international standards may be costly, and the realization of the advantages
of TRIPs will require more than just the implementation of new laws and
regulatory enforcement mechanisms. Nonetheless, compliance by ASEAN
countries will ultimately generate an in-flow of technology, goods and
services to Southeast Asia as a whole,5" thereby contributing to the
economic development of each country.
B. International Standards for Patent Protection Under TRIPs
The TRIPs Agreement provides a minimum level of protection to
facilitate trade for seven forms of intellectual property, including patents.59
As a general matter, since each ASEAN country already has some type of
3" Kennedy, supra note 18, at 474.
53 Id.
' Marie Wilson, TRIPs Agreement Implications for ASEAN Protection of Computer Technology, 4
ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 18,24 (1997).
s5 Id.
' Id. at 25.
" Chia Siow Yue & Tan, supra note 1, at 8.
58 See id.
"' Other intellectual properties covered by the TRIPs Agreement include Copyright and Related
Rights, Trademarks, Geographical Indications, Industrial Designs, Layout-Designs (Topographies) of
Integrated Circuits, and Protection of Undisclosed Information. The seven forms of intellectual property
are addressed categorically in Sections I through 7 of Part II of the TRIPs Agreement.
For a discussion on the various possible levels of intellectual property protection: 1) non-robust level
of protection, 2) a level which facilitates trade, as per TRIPs, and 3) a robust level capable of investment
stimulation, see Sherwood, supra note 37, at 494.
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infrastructure in place for administering IP protection, the obligations
imposed for all categories of intellectual property are likely to require the
modification or strengthening of existing features of national systems rather
than the implementation of new procedures. 60
The coverage of patents is considered the most significant
achievement of Part II of the Agreement, entitled "Standards Concerning the
Availability, Scope and Use of Intellectual Property. "61 It is also the section
requiring the greatest compromise between the competing interests of
developed and developing countries.62
The minimum standards of patent protection are clearly enumerated in
the Agreement. First, patent applications cannot be discriminated against
due to subject matter; patents must be "available for any inventions, whether
products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are
new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application.
63
Discrimination is also prohibited "as to the place of invention, field of
technology and whether inventions are imported or locally produced."
6
"
Moreover, where a patent's subject matter is a product, the rights
conferred on patent owners must encompass the right to prevent third parties
from "making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these
purposes that product."'65 Simultaneously, a patent owner of a process must
be afforded the right to prevent non-consensual acts of "using, offering for
sale, selling, or importing for these purposes at least the product obtained
directly by that process." 66
6' Id. at 513.
61 Kennedy, supra note 18, at 477.
62 Id.
63 The terms "inventive step" and "capable of industrial application" are synonymous with "non
obvious" and "useful" respectively. TRIPs Agreement art. 27.
" Member countries, however, may refuse patents for inventions if "necessary to protect order or
morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the
environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by
their law." Id.
Other possible exclusions from patentability are "(a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for
the treatment of humans or animals; (b) plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially
biological processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological
processes." Id. Protection for plant varieties, however, must be made available "either by patents or by an
effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof." Id. Furthermore, any such sui generis system
must be consistent with the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants.
Kennedy, supra note 18, at 481.
65 TRIPs Agreement art. 28.
6 Patent owners must also be afforded "the right to assign, or transfer by succession, the patent and
to conclude licensing contracts." Id.
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Member countries must also require that an application for a patent
"disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for the
invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art."67
The most extensive TRIPs provisions with respect to patents cover
compulsory licensing.68  Out of concern of excessive government
encroachment on the rights of patent owners, Article 31 imposes numerous
restrictions on national prescriptions of compulsory licenses before the use
of existing patented inventions or processes can be granted by country
members.69  A compulsory license can be granted only after efforts have
been made to secure authorization from the patent holder, unless the grant is
necessary to remedy an anti-competitive practice.70  The Agreement
mandates that several conditions be met before a compulsory license can be
granted notwithstanding infringement of the rights of the patent owner, and
requires judicial review of the grant.7' TRIPs provides that compensation
must be afforded to the holder once a compulsory license is granted, and
also limits the scope and usage of the license.72
Apart from the requisite review of compulsory licenses, a patent
owner must be afforded an opportunity for judicial review of any decision of
67 Member countries have the option of demanding "the applicant to indicate the best mode for
carrying out the invention known to the inventor at the filing date or, where priority is claimed, at the
priority date of the application[,]" and/or "to provide information concerning the applicant's corresponding
foreign applications and grants." Id. art. 29.
Countries may also "provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided
that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate
interests of third parties." Id. The terms "unreasonable" and "legitimate" are undefined, leaving a potential
for future disputes. Kennedy, supra note 18, at 481.
" Compulsory licensing is the grant under the law of any member country "for other use of the
subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the right holder, including use by the govemment or
third parties authorized by the government." TRIPs Agreement art. 31. The common bases for the
authorization of a compulsory license in countries with compulsory licensing systems include the patent
owner's failure to implement the invention within a certain time-frame following receipt of a patent, or to
prevent or remedy other anti-competitive practices that may result or have resulted from the exercise of the
exclusive patent rights of the owner. Kennedy, supra note 18, at 481.
'9 TRIPs Agreement art. 31.
70 "This requirement may be waived by a member country in the case of a national emergency or
other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use," but "the right holder
shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as reasonably practicable." Id.
" Id. Two important qualifications regarding compulsory licenses set forth in the Paris Convention,
and integrated into the TRIPs Agreement, are 1) no proceedings for the forfeiture or revocation of a patent
may be instituted before the expiration of two years from the grant of the first compulsory license; and 2) a
compulsory license may not be applied for on the ground of failure to work or insufficient working of the
invention before the expiration of a period of four years from the date of filing of the patent application or
three years from the date of the grant of the patent, whichever period expires last. Kennedy, supra note 18,
at 481-82.
' TRIPs Agreement art. 31.
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revocation or forfeiture of a patent.73 The TRIPs Agreement also prescribes
a minimum period of patent protection of twenty years from the filing date.74
With respect to adjudication of infringement claims, the Agreement
shifts the burden of proof to the alleged infringer in an infringement action.
It mandates that when an action concerns a patented process for obtaining a
product, member countries must provide the national judiciary the authority
to impose upon the defendant the burden of proving that the process used to
obtain an identical product is different from the patented process.75 Where a
product produced by the alleged infringing process is identical to a product
that produced by the patented process, the presumption that the identical
product was obtained by the patented process is raised if, 1) the product
obtained by the patented process is new, or 2) there is a substantial
likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and through
reasonable efforts the owner of the patent has been unable to determine the
process actually used.76
IV. RECONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL LAWS IN COMPLIANCE WITH
TRIPS
Compliance with the TRIPs provisions requires a heightened
recognition by the governments of ASEAN members of the reforms needed
in established national patent systems. This reform entails, largely, the
promulgation of new laws or the modification of existing ones, consistent
with international standards. Indeed, all of the ASEAN countries have
begun implementing changes to their intellectual property legal framework.
For instance, in July of 1996, Vietnam implemented the Civil Code, a
fair portion of which addresses intellectual property rights.77 The Civil Code
replaced the existing laws governing IP matters, including the Ordinance on
the Protection of Industrial Property of January 28, 1989.78 Considering
Vietnam's history of weak IPR protection, the execution of the new piece of
legislation, coupled with subsequent IP regulations, illustrates the great
73 id.
74 Id. art. 33.
7' Id. art. 34.
76 Id.
' Stephen Hayward, Vietnam Continues Trademark Reforms: Protection is Much Better, but There
are Still Questions About Enforcement, available in Law Journal Extra! (visited Nov. 9, 1998)
<http://www.ipcenter.com/express/030498/vietip.htm>.
" MARTINDALE-HUBBELL INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST (1998). See generally Martin W.
Chow, Vietnam, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA, supra note 7, at 507, 513-19.
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strides that Vietnam has made in its attempt to ensure greater protection for
intellectual property.79
Similarly, in March of 1997, the Indonesian House of Representatives
passed several amendments consistent with international standards to the
country's IP laws under the existing Patent Law of 1991 ."
The Philippines has come closer to conforming with TRIPs by enacting
reforms to the intellectual property administrative structure and the
implementation of recent laws governing IPRs. On June 6, 1997, a national
intellectual property office was created to oversee all aspects of IP in the
Philippines." The office, with broader enforcement authority than the
intellectual property agency that it replaced, consists of six bureaus, including a
separate.bureau for patents." The government also enacted new legislation,
effective January 1, 1998, which is intended to restructure the country's
intellectual property system and to bring the country into compliance with the
TRIPS provisions." The Code incorporates the TRIPs standards and
strengthens the Philippines' protection and enforcement of IPRs."4
Singapore-the most developed member of ASEAN-is in
substantial compliance with the TRIPs Agreement as a result of the new
patent law enacted on February 23, 1997.5 The legislation replaced the
existing patent system under which an applicant seeking protection had to
have acquired a British patent or a European Patent through the EPO with
the United Kingdom as the designated country.86
Apart from the adoption of reforms to individual national patent
systems, the ASEAN countries have also pursued regional cooperation on IP
matters. This intra-national collaboration prompted the formation of the
1995 ASEAN Framework Agreement on Intellectual Property Cooperation
("Framework Agreement"). 7 Pursuant to the Framework Agreement,
members formally recognized the important role which IPRs assumed in
Hayward, supra note 77.
s Indonesia Amends IP Laws, J. PROPRIETARY RTS., July 1997, at 25. See generally Cita
Citrawinda Priapantja, Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, in INVEST IN INDONESIA 59 (Beena Sorab
ed., 1997).
sI New Intellectual Property Law Takes Effect in Philippines, J. PROPRIETARY RTS., Apr. 1998, at
19.
82 Id.
83 Id. See also Alonzo Q. Ancheta, Philippines Begins New IP Regime, available in Law Journal
Extra! (visited Mar. 10, 1999) <http://www.ipww.com/jan98/p9philippines.html>. See generally Jimenez,
supra note 25, at 279-80.
u Ancheta, supra note 83.
s Alban Kang, Singapore, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA, supra note 7, at
323-24.
6 Id.
" See Framework Agreement.
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trade and economic development in Southeast Asia.8 Acknowledging the
need for compliance with international standards prescribed in established
multi-lateral agreements on IP matters, particularly the TRIPs Agreement,
signatory members conceded to strengthen ASEAN cooperation in
intellectual property protection and enforcement, and to explore the
possibility of establishing ASEAN patent and trademark systems.8 9 The
Framework Agreement marked a significant step towards the harmonization
of national intellectual property laws of the ASEAN countries."
V. PROSPECT OF AN ASEAN PATENT OFFICE
As the Framework Agreement intimates, ASEAN member countries
anticipate the creation of an ASEAN Patent Office in the near future. 9'
Although no formal deadline has been announced, the Framework
Agreement states only that "Member States shall explore the possibility of
setting up of an ASEAN patent system, including an ASEAN Patent Office,
"192if feasible, to promote the region-wide protection of patent...
The notion of consolidating national IP systems into a central regional
system is by no means a new concept. Indeed, throughout the history of
international intellectual property law several regional patent systems have
been created. The oldest and most notable patent system is the European
Patent Convention ("EPC").93 Adopted in Munich in 1973, the EPC
simplified the patent application process for all member countries. 4  An
's Id.
89 Id. art. 3.
9' A Working Group on Intellectual Property Cooperation ("WGIPC") was established to implement
the Framework Agreement and to provide a forum for discussions on regional and international
developments on intellectual property. The WGIPC formulated its Programme of Action (1996-98), in
which the goals enumerated are:
to enhance the IP enforcement and protection;
to strengthen ASEAN IP administration;
to strengthen ASEAN IP legislation;
to promote human resources development;
to promote public awareness of IPR;
to promote private sector cooperation in IP; and
to explore the possibility of setting up an ASEAN Patent and Trademark System. ASEAN,
Cooperation in Intellectual Property (visited Nov. 9, 1998) <http://www.asean.or.id/asc/r9697/asc96t6.htm>.
"' Framework Agreement art. I.
92 Id.
"3 Other existing regional patent offices are the European Community Patent Convention ('CPC"),
the African Industrial Property Convention ("OAPI"), the African Regional Industrial Property
Organization ("ARIPO"), and the Eurasian Patent Convention. Yu, supra note 9, at 94.
9' There are currently 19 country members party to the European Patent Convention ("EPC"),
including all the members of the European Union: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France,
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applicant may file an application with the European Patent Office ("EPO")
in one of the three official languages-English, French, and German-to
obtain patent protection in any or all designated member countries. 95 A
patent granted by the EPO affords an applicant the same rights as would be
afforded a national patent granted in a designated member country.96
An ASEAN patent office, as envisioned by ASEAN members, would
essentially create a central patent application and acquisition system for the
ASEAN region. Such a scheme would benefit both ASEAN members and
inventors interested in acquiring IPRs protection in any or all of the ASEAN
countries. It would enable an inventor, or existing patent owner, to submit
to the regional office an application which, following a substantive
examination, would result in a grant of an ASEAN patent enforceable in the
countries designated by the applicant. The rights afforded with the grant of
an ASEAN patent would attach as if the applicant had individually filed
applications in the designated countries. This would greatly reduce the
amount of time, labor, and costs generally associated with patent acquisition
for inventors under the current system. Moreover, the institution of a
regional patent office would relieve national patent offices of the task of
performing extensive and time-consuming application examinations, hence,
administrative and financial burdens would be lessened.
Under the envisioned ASEAN patent office, if patterned similarly to
the EPC, patent enforcement remains within the jurisdiction of individual
countries. 97 Thus, infringement claims of an ASEAN patent are subject to
Germany, Hellenic Republic, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. Mossinghoff& Kuo, supra note 5, at n.30.
" Id. at 535. Applicants who are nationals of member countries may file in their own language,
provided that a translation in one of the three official languages is made available within 13 months of the
priority date accorded upon receipt of the patent application by the European Patent Office ("EPO"). Id. at
536. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
The EPC adheres to the first-to-file system, under which the first true inventor who files for patent
protection with the EPC and discloses his or her invention to the public has priority to an EPC patent.
Priority may also be claimed through a prior national application as provided in the Paris Convention.
Mossinghoff& Kuo, supra note 5, at 536.
Once the EPO receives an application, it conducts a formal requirements examination. Upon payment
of proper fees, the application is sent to a Search Division, which conducts a novelty search and provides a
European search report (and for each international application under the PCT, a "Euro/PCT"' search report).
The European patent application is published eighteen months from its filing date or the priority date, along
with the search report. Id.
' A European patent however, is not equivalent to a community patent; a European patent owner
receives a series of patents that are enforceable only in the EPC member countries designated in the
application. Id. at 535. Enforcement of rights acquired under a European patent falls, therefore, within the
jurisdiction of the individual designated countries, subject to national laws. Id.
" See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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national laws and are invariably enforced differently from one country to
another.
Confronted with international standards imposed by TRIPs under the
current patent framework, the ASEAN countries endure and will continue to
endure a heavy burden on the public administration of patent rights. 98 In
fact, over time the struggle for compliance with the standards will reveal the
deficiencies, particularly lack of expertise, inadequate funding, and
inefficient processing, in the public administration of many of the existing
national systems. Such deficiencies could impede or render such
compliance impossible. Given these constraints, the institution of a regional
patent office would alleviate the administrative strain on the national
systems. The consolidation of resources can empower the ASEAN
countries to administer patent rights in an efficient and resourceful manner.
A. Administrative Efficiency
As the ASEAN countries restructure their national patent systems to
achieve compliance with the TRIPs requirements, they encounter greater
burdens on public administration.9 9 This burden is probably more acute for
countries with recently established and still unsophisticated patent systems
such as Cambodia," Vietnam,'0 ' and Indonesia. 2 Of the seven categories
of intellectual property protection addressed in the TRIPs Agreement, patent
acquisition and maintenance imposes the heaviest burden on public
administration for developing countries. 0 3  The TRIPs Agreement will
presumably have the effect of requiring adjustments to existing
administrative structures rather than the creation of new infrastructures.' ° 4
Nonetheless, the process of reconstructing administrative practices may
gradually expose the deficiencies inherent in the administration of existing
ASEAN national systems and ultimately confirm the need for an ASEAN
Patent Office to remedy such deficiencies.
Of the requirements imposed by TRIPs, several in particular may cause
administrative strain on the ASEAN countries. With the expansion of
patentable subject-matters in all fields of technology and few exceptions
" See Sherwood, supra note 37, at 518.
'9 See id. at 511.
" See generally Dolores A. Donovan & Jeffrey S. Brand, Cambodia, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAWS OF EAST ASIA, supra note 7, at 107.
01 See generally Chow, supra note 78.
102 See generally Priapantja, supra note 80.
03 Sherwood, supra note 37, at 518.
104 See id.
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allowed under TRIPs, those ASEAN countries that have traditionally enjoyed
broad exclusionary practices are now burdened with examining many types of
inventions previously excluded from patentability.' The administrative
burden presented by this provision may be further aggravated by the restriction
on discriminating against certain patent applications. Moreover, the
requirement that patent applications disclose inventions sufficiently clearly and
completely for the inventions to be carried out by persons skilled in the art may
demand some administrative adjustments for ASEAN members that have not
previously recognized such a practice."°  Finally, the provisions covering
compulsory licensing could also present an occasional but definite strain on
public administration for the ASEAN countries."0 7
1. Expertise
There is a strong need for patent law training in the ASEAN region.'
The TRIPs Agreement has had the effect of broadening the scope of patent
law"° and possibly rendering more technical the administration of patents in
light of the expansive range of patentable inventions. Given the inadequate
level of expertise in patent law in most national offices, strict conformance
with international standards by the ASEAN countries would compel
substantial investment in the training of public officials as well as certain
members of the private sectors.'°
Greater expertise in patent law is required of government officers who
administer patent offices and of lawyers and engineers acting in their
capacity as advisors and representatives of patentees."' The latter group is
generally referred to as "agents.12 Officials performing a "substantive
examination" of patent applications' 3 have the most critical need for
105 See id.
" See id.
0o See id. at 519.
" Yu, supra note 9, at 79.
' Sherwood, supra note 37, at 524.
1o See Yu, supra note 9, at 79.
Id.
112 Id.
"I Under the TRIPs Agreement and in all ASEAN nations, patents are granted for inventions only if
they satisfy the general formal requirements of novelty, inventiveness, and industrial use, which may be
variably defined. See generally INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA, supra note 7. While
the patent laws of some developing countries, including the ASEAN countries with the exception of Brunei
and Singapore, provide that the national patent offices shall perform substantive examinations of
applications, others do not address the matter. See Yu, supra note 9, at 80. See also Sherwood, supra note
37, at 527. In reality, most of those countries that statutorily stipulate for substantive examinations do not
perform such examinations due to the high level of expertise required. Id. Currently, only a few patent
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training because they must be able to decipher the technical language in
patent applications and also possess sufficient expertise in both the relevant
technological field and the legal requirements for patentability." 4 That level
of expertise requires not only extensive knowledge of the domestic patent
laws, but also a solid understanding of international standards and those of
national competitors.
While the market demand for patent examiners is high world-wide, the
number of qualified candidates is limited."5 At the international level, highly
specialized examiners are primarily scientists and engineers who have been
trained in large intellectual property offices, such as those in Japan, the United
States, and the European Patent Office." 6 Due to the rapid expansion of the
scope of patentability in various specialized technological areas, larger IP
offices employ between 1,500 to 2,000 examiners on a permanent basis." 7
Since the salaries at such larger offices are higher than what the
ASEAN countries can offer, the ability of the member countries to recruit
and retain qualified patent examiners is frustrated by lack of financial
resources." 8 Given the lack of financial resources in many ASEAN member
countries, adequate training of their resident specialists may also prove to be
too costly. A deficiency in specialized patent examiners for the ASEAN
countries might, in the long run, hinder reforms to existing national patent
systems of ASEAN countries.
A regional ASEAN Patent Office would allow member countries to
share the costs associated with the training of patent examiners by individual
countries. Indeed, as specified in the Framework Agreement, the ASEAN
countries have agreed to explore viable cooperative activities to promote the
"[n]etworking of intellectual property training facilities or centres of
excellence on intellectual property" and the "[e]xchange of intellectual
property personnel and experts"; and "to explore the possibility of
establishing a regional training institute for intellectual property."" 9 Rather
than have each country incur expenses rebuilding national administrative
personnel, the ASEAN members can consolidate their resources to recruit
and secure a team of diversely specialized experts of a higher caliber.
offices are financially and administratively capable of meaningful examinations of patent applications for
substance. Id.
"' Yu, supra note 9, at 79-80.




"9 Framework Agreement art. 3.
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2. Costs
Compliance with international standards imposed under TRIPs will
entail considerable administrative expenses apart from those attributable to
training staff personnel and experts. Such expenses include both start-up
costs for the institution of new functions as well as operating costs.
20
Of the reforms which the TRIPs Agreement imposes on WTO members,
the expansion of patentability to other fields of inventions probably has the
most significant impact on the public administration of national IP offices, and
results in the largest increase in administrative costs for the ASEAN
countries.' 2 ' As the deadline for compliance with TRIPs draws near, the
ASEAN IP offices must be prepared for a potential influx of applications that
will invariably burden examination and processing procedures. 
2
For most, if not all, of the ASEAN countries, the potential increase of
submissions may call for extensive reconstruction of the infrastructure of
patent systems, and thus increase administrative costs. To safeguard the
efficient administration of patents, national IP offices must enhance their
information technology systems. This may entail upgrading documentation
systems, installing electronic databases of industrial property information, or
developing intra-regional and international information networks. 123  The
extent to which the countries will incur expenses will depend on the degree
to which they are currently in compliance with TRIPs, and certainly on
national leaders' willingness to expend resources. Regardless, the
establishment of an ASEAN Patent Office has the potential for greatly
reducing the aggregate administrative costs for the ASEAN region.
Another form of administrative cost which the countries may shoulder
stems from substantive examinations. 24  Because of the expenses and
expertise compelled by such procedures, many countries tend to forgo
examinations for substance altogether.
25
'2o Sherwood, supra note 37, at 522.
121 See id. at 524.
1" See id.
'" See Hisamitsu Arai, Policy Issues Relating to Industrial Property Rights Protection in the 21st
Century, INTELL. PROP. ASIA & PAC.: Q.J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., July-Sept. 1997, at 24, 28-30
(paper presented at the WIPO Asian Regional Forum on Intellectual Property Rights in the 21st Century
Sept. 10-12, 1997). See also Kamil Idris, Address at the WIPO Asian Regional Forum on Intellectual
Property Rights in the 21st Century, INTELL. PROP. ASIA & PAC.: Q.J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
July-Sept. 1997, at 17, 19-21.
"2 Sherwood, supra note 37, at 527-28.
.2 See supra note 113 and accompanying text. In many developing countries, national IP offices
would, as an unofficial matter, ask applicants for proof that a patent for an invention for which protection is
sought has been previously granted by another patent office, usually of a major developed country such as
the United States. Sherwood, supra note 37, at 529. Indeed, Singapore expressly requests such
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Again, a regional patent office can alleviate the financial impediments
to substantive examinations for the ASEAN countries. It would eliminate
the need for each individual member country to execute technical
examinations. A centralized scheme for examining patent applications for
substance, through a pooling of national resources, is economically sound
and should be equally, if not more, effective than substance examinations
performed by national IP offices.
In addition, with the advent of a multi-lateral system for "rationalizing"
application filing under the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the administrative costs
associated with technical examinations can be further curtailed.1, 6 As
mentioned above, of the seven ASEAN country members, only Vietnam,
Indonesia, and Singapore are signatories to the international convention.
Therefore, the unequivocal advantages that underlie the PCT scheme cannot
likely be realized until all ASEAN countries accede to the treaty.'27
3. Efficiency in the Application Process
A common concern shared by all inventors seeking patent protection
in foreign countries is the lagging administration of a patent. 28 This
concern is probably multiplied several times for those seeking protection in
developing countries, including the ASEAN countries, of which many have
in the past earned the reputation for delays in the application process.
29
Patentees and applicants evaluate the performance of an IP office by the
range of services provided as well as by the expediency of the process for
the granting of IPRs. 30 An extended lapse of time between the date of
application and its disposition leaves applicants in an unnecessary state of
uncertainty, with a potential for damage to business ventures.'' Such a
scenario is of a particular concern for foreign applicants, who generate over
ninety percent of the patent applications in ASEAN region.'32
There are a variety of reasons that may account for the delays in patent
processing. One is poor budget allocations, which may impede national patent
information. Id. Generally employed by countries without the capability of performing substantive
examination, this practice is a reliable indicator of whether an application, by international standard, has
satisfied the formal requirements for patentability. Id.
126 See supra Part III.A. There has been recent discussion on the possibility of extending the multi-
lateral system for filing patent application that exists currently under the PCT to the entire WIPO.
.2 See Yu, supra note 9, at 72-73, 76.
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offices from smoothly functioning.'33 With an independently financed regional
patent office, refined accounting records would ameliorate resource budgeting,
secure consistent allotments of funds, and insure against under-funding.
Delayed patent processing also stems from outdated infrastructure.1
34
Notwithstanding the promulgation of new laws, regulations, and procedural
adjustments, national efforts to conform to international standards are
frustrated by sub-standard infrastructures in many of the ASEAN
countries.'35 Recognizing the need for reform of national IP administrative
infrastructures, the ASEAN countries have begun to join together in an
effort to "strengthen ASEAN intellectual property administration.' 36 As
prescribed in the Framework Agreement, members shall participate in
activities geared toward the institution of "automation to improve the
administration of intellectual property" and an "ASEAN database on
intellectual property registration.""'
Once formed, an ASEAN Patent Office would alleviate many of the
administrative burdens currently endured by each country under the current
framework for the patent disbursement. By raising the level of expertise in
patent law for the ASEAN region, reducing the costs associated with patent
administration, and improving the efficiency of the application process, the
office can improve the overall productivity of patent administration in the
ASEAN region. It would thereby bring ASEAN country members
considerably closer to international standards.
VI.. GOING BEYOND THE EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION-
HARMONIZATION OF SUBSTANTIVE PATENT LAWS
A legal framework for the administration and regulation of patents
is indispensible in all patent systems, but the ultimate consideration for an
inventor as to whether protection should be sought in any one particular
country is the degree to which patent rights are enforceable under the
country's legal framework.' A scheme for the protection of rights, as
applied to all forms of intellectual property, is futile absent administrative
... See Sherwood, supra note 37, at 522-23.
See supra Part V.A.2.
3 See Dato Kandan, Information Technology and Information Network for Strengthening Industrial
Property Administration, INTELL. PROP. ASIA & PAC.: Q.J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., July-Sept.
1997, at 37 (paper presented at the WIPO Asian Regional Forum on Intellectual Property Rights in the 21st
Century; discussing Malaysia's plan to incorporate information technology into the administration of
industrial property through the Multimedia Super Corridor project).
36 Framework Agreement art. 3.
137 Id.
"3 Yu, supra note 9, at 78.
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and judicial enforcement mechanisms.3 9 Recognizing this, the TRIPs
Agreement sets forth minimum standards for the enforcement of
intellectual property rights. 40
Although a regional patent arrangement has enormous potential for
providing the level of protection implied under TRIPs, it would fail to
operate in its optimal capacity if it lacks an effective means of
enforcement. The lack of uniform post-grant enforcement procedures
under the European Patent Convention has resulted in disparate treatment
of patents granted by the European Patent Office, and created a patent
system that can be considerably refined.' 4 ' While the situation has not
substantially undermined the operation of the EPO, the absence of
harmonization of post-grant proceedings under an ASEAN regional patent
scheme could have adverse consequences for patent owners in ASEAN
nations. Given the exceedingly deficient enforcement mechanisms under
most of the existing national patent systems in Southeast Asia, 142 a patent
granted through an ASEAN regional patent office may have little force in
those designated countries. Thus, the need for harmonization of
enforcement procedures under a unitary patent law in the ASEAN region
is compelling.
A. Enforcement Under TRIPs
The TRIPs Agreement sets forth in broad terms, in Articles 41 to
61, measures to ensure that legal remedies are accessible under national
patent systems for protection against the infringement of intellectual
property rights. WTO signatory members are to implement expeditious
remedies for the prevention and deterrence of infringements."' Civil,
judicial, and administrative procedures must be made available to
intellectual property owners. They must be implemented in a fair and
equitable manner, with consideration to the rights of both the patent
owners and the accused violators.'44 The Agreement dictates that judicial
authorities shall have the authority to order injunctions and award
"3 Sherwood, supra note 37, at 536.
'4o TRIPs Agreement arts. 41-61.
'4' Mossinghoff& Kuo, supra note 5, at 537.
142 See Jeffrey J. Blatt & Phillip H. Miller, Preparing for the Pacific Century: Fostering Technology
Transfer in Southeast Asia, 3 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 235, 251-53 (discussing deficient
enforcement remedies for technology transfer agreements in Southeast Asian countries).
' TRIPs Agreement arts. 41-61.
14 Id.
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damages as deemed appropriate when infringement is found. 145 They may
order indemnification to an accused when a patent owner abused
enforcement procedures. 146  Criminal sanctions shall also be made
available.147 Moreover, protection for IPR must be afforded at national
borders; patent owners may file a request for the suspension by custom
authorities of the release into free circulation of goods protected.141
Despite the extensive enforcement provisions in actuality, the
TRIPs Agreement provides only general guidance. It aspires to impose
upon signatory countries minimum requirements for the enforcement of
IPRs, but grants members enormous leeway in the implementation of
enforcement measures. The Agreement appears to recognize the
constraints in establishing standardized remedial procedures in light of the
differences in national legal systems and limitations confronted by many
developing countries. 149.  Article 41(5) provides that the TRIPs
Agreement:
does not create any obligation to put in place a judicial
system for the enforcement of intellectual property rights
distinct from that for the enforcement of law in general, nor
does it affect the capacity of Members to enforce their law in
general ... [Nor does it create] any obligation with respect to
the distribution of resources as between enforcement of
intellectual property rights and the enforcement of law in
general. 50
In effect, countries are at liberty to adopt any enforcement procedures
they deem financially and legally feasible under domestic legal
frameworks.
For many developing countries with deficient legal systems, the
ASEAN countries included, it is debatable whether they can observe the
tasks charged under TRIPs. Indeed, the domestic judicial systems of
many of the developing signatory members are already ill-functioned in
other areas of law; there is little expectation that intellectual property law





Sherwood, supra note 37, at 537.
's TRIPs Agreement art. 41.
" Sherwood, supra note 37, at 537.
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B. Inadequate Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement in ASEAN
Countries
As a general matter, an enormous risk involved in conducting business
in Southeast Asia is the lack of reliable legal redress. 52  In many ASEAN
countries, legal systems are antiquated and discretionary in comparison with
those of developed countries.'53 General weaknesses inherent in national
judicial systems are equally apparent in the area of intellectual property law.
They account for the inadequate enforcement of IPRs in the ASEAN region,
and are associated with uncontrollable upsurge of counterfeiting and piracy of
protected goods.'54 Remedies for intellectual property rights violations can
become completely effective only with a sweeping reconstruction of judicial
systems,' which is probably an impossible task for most of the ASEAN
members at the present time. Moreover, any form of international imposition
of domestic judicial reforms might invoke resistance from certain political
elites. 156
Notwithstanding new legislation governing IPRs, the lack of
administrative and judicial mechanisms to ensure that patent rights are
enforced undermines the efforts of ASEAN governments to strengthen
protection. For instance, the Civil Code in Vietnam fails to provide a
comprehensive law on intellectual property rights.157 The lack of enforcement
regulations renders provisions governing 1P essentially ineffective."'
Regulations were passed thereafter in October 1996, but only recapitulated the
provisions in the Civil Code.'59 Enforcement procedures in the event of
infringement are not enumerated in any of the laws subsequently
promulgated.' 6°
'z Blatt & Miller, supra note 142, at 251.
153 Id.
" Yu, supra note 9, at 78. See generally BANKOLE SODIPO, PIRACY AND COUNTERFEITING:
GATT, TRIPS, AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1997).
... See Sherwood, supra note 37, at 538. See also Rumu Sakar, The Legal Implications of Financial
Sector Reform in Emerging Capital Markets, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 705 (1998) (introducing the need
for structural legal reform to attract and sustain foreign investment in developing and emerging
economies-China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, and Russia (countries undergoing a transition from a
"developing" status to one of "emerging capital market")-through three reforms: 1) changing the role of
the state; 2) instituting a Rule of Law regime, which may require at a minimum, modernizing existing legal,
regulatory, and judicial systems; and 3) encouraging democratization).
156 Sherwood, supra note 37, at 537.
"1 Hayward, supra note 77.
15 Id.
159 Id.
" Much reliance is still given to an old piece of legislation, Decree 140/HDBT enacted April 1991,
which purportedly ceased to exist with the enactment of the Vietnamese Civil Code. Id.
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Moreover, judicial remedies in Vietnam are futile due to unreasonable
delays and lack of interim injunctions, and indeed are rarely sought. 6 ' This is
probably attributable to the novelty of Vietnam's court structure for the
adjudication of commercial disputes, and the lack of commercial and judicial
experience of Vietnamese judges. 62  Prior to 1986, Vietnam had no
established commercial law and only a limited court structure; Economic
Courts were created only recently in 1994.163 Consequently, IPRs
infringement remains rampant."6 The chaotic nature built into Vietnam's legal
framework is also apparent in the Cambodian and Laotian judicial systems. 65
In many cases, foreign patent owners conducting business in Southeast Asia
are better off resorting to alternative resolution mechanisms such as informal
negotiation and settlement, than pursuing judicial remedies.' 66
Some ASEAN nations, on the other hand, have successfully
implemented partial regulatory enforcement measures to crack down on
IPRs violations. In Singapore, an IP unit was created in the Commercial
Crimes Division of the Singapore Police Force in 1996.167 Similarly, the
enforcement unit in the Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs
of Malaysia, dealing with IP matters, has also been strengthened. 68
Furthermore, the governments of Thailand and the Philippines expressed
determination to suppress IP rights violations through legislation and stricter
enforcement of existing laws. 69  Thailand's Prime Minister announced a
national interest in enforcement of copyright and patent laws through
seizures and the imposition of harsher penalties, and in conducting an
examination of the Customs Department clearance practices. 7  These
actions were instigated in response to threats of possible retaliatory trade
measures by the United States and/or the European Union. 71
161 id.
" Claude Rohwer, Progress and Problems in Vietnam's Development of Commercial Law, 15
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 275, 280 (1997).
163 id.
'64 U.S. EMMBASSY, HANOI, COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE: VIETNAM 1997 (Sept. 30, 1996),
available in Australian National University Social Sciences/Asian Studies Server (visited Nov. 9, 1998)
<http://coombs.anu.edu.au/-vern/vn-commercial-guide.html>.
16' See Blatt & Miller, supra note 142, at 252.
166 id.
167 Yu, supra note 9, at 78.
," Id. Notwithstanding the availability of administrative and judicial remedies for IPRs owners,
multi-national computer software manufacturing enterprises operating in Malaysia have cooperated in
forming the Business Software Alliance ("BSA") to prevent infringing acts through self-help measures.
Bentley J. Anderson, Malaysia, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA, supra note 7, at
185, 189.
'" Thailand and the Philippines Promise Piracy Crackdowns, J. Proprietary Rts., July 1997, at 24.
170 Id.
171 Id.
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In the alternative, ASEAN nations may consider judicial reforms as
possible transient remedies to the deficiencies in the domestic legal
framework. Countries may enhance training of judges in courts of general
jurisdiction, thereby expanding knowledge of IP law and improving judicial
performance. 172 Another option may be the institution of specialized courts
to handle, among other intellectual property matters, patent infringement
cases. 73  Countries that select this route will realize the potential for
efficient adjudication of IPRs violations, intense concentration on IP law,
and better quality decision-making, 174 which can lead to heightened
safeguards against extraneous influences. Currently, Thailand is the only
ASEAN country that has succeeded in establishing a system of specialized
IP courts, joining China, Germany, United Kingdom, and the United States,
which have adopted similar systems. 7 1
As a long-term goal, ASEAN countries may opt for a thorough up-
grade of national judicial systems. If and when such a course of action is
pursued, the transformation will be gradual, painstaking, and fairly
revolutionary for some countries. Meanwhile, the altematives enumerated
above are feasible and can be effective enforcement measures.
C. Social & Political Cultural Factors Undermine Enforcement Efforts
Notwithstanding the implementation of enforcement measure, factors
distinct from judicial and administrative structures, but just as deeply-rooted
in the cultures of many ASEAN countries, impede governmental efforts at
heightened enforcement. These impediments are cultural and political
norms that are not entirely amenable to the ideologies of commercial law, or
in this case IPRs, which arguably derive from the Western culture. 76 In
many Southeast Asian societies where governmental leadership is
historically manifested in customary practices, religion, and despotism,
western-influenced laws assume a new function within, rather than a
7" See Sherwood, supra note 37, at 539.
173 Id.
174 id.
"71 Yu, supra note 9, at 80-81. See also Judge Vichai Ariyanumtaka, The Enforcement ofIntellectual
Property Rights and the Role of the Central Intellectual Property and International Trade Court in
Thailand, INTELL. PROP. ASIA & PAC.: Q.J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., Jan.-June 1998, at 31.
176 Sarkar, supra note 155, at 722-23. See also Doris Estelle Long, The Impact of Foreign Investment
on Indigenous Culture: An Intellectual Property Perspective, 23 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 229, 246-
48 (1998) (conceding that most intellectual property law models are based on Western, capitalist
philosophy; that intellectual property rights as protectable rights were first recognized in Western Europe
where individual ownership of property was possible).
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replacement of pre-existing frameworks of governance.'7 7 Consequently,
many Southeast Asian countries do not share the same history of IP
protection as Western countries.'78 In light of such traditional norms and the
lack of historical groundwork for IP legal frameworks similar to those in
developed countries, the battle against IP piracy and counterfeiting in
ASEAN countries most likely cannot be resolved by legislative enactments
and regulatory measures alone.
1. Cultural Constraints
In many Southeast Asian societies, unfamiliarity of Western
introduced IP laws is further exacerbated by certain cultural attitudes among
the local populace and governing elites vis-a-vis intellectual property rights.
Even when individuals do recognize IPR as personal rights, skepticism
towards intellectual property tends to undermine the effects of enforcement
measures.
This attitude stems from the lack of benefits to the national interests
which the public believes would result in the event greater IP protection is
granted. 9 As mentioned above, most patents granted in ASEAN countries
are to foreign inventors.' However, despite the potential in imported
products, there is still a possibility for under-utilization of inventions in the
patent within the granting country.' 8' Although technology transfers have
been an impetus for ASEAN countries to intensify patent protection, 82 a
foreign patent owner does not have to enter the market of the granting
country. 8 3 A patent granted in one of the countries may be employed to
prevent others from making or selling the product in the market.'
" Dolores A. Donovan, Codification in Developing Nations: Ritual and Symbol in Cambodia and
Indonesia, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 693, 694 (1998) (arguing that "in societies where ordering the behavior
of people and govemments is largely accomplished by mechanisms other than written law, written law
necessarily has little to do with the regulation of conduct.").
70 Blatt & Miller, supra note 142, at 242. It is a commonly shared view in Western literature that
within many East Asian cultures, intellectual properties have not traditionally been regarded as private
capital goods. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA, supra note 7, at 19. Cf. Toshiko
Takenaka, Does a Cultural Barrier to Intellectual Property Trade Exist? The Japanese Example, 29
N.Y.U. J. INT'L LAW & POL., 153-54 (1997) (concluding that Japan has had a long history of technology
monopolies before the adoption of a modem intellectual property system; that the differences between
Japanese and Westem--European and U.S.-intellectual property practices are not attributable to culture;
and that cultural differences do not impede intellectual property trade).
' See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA, supra note 7, at 19.
's See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
SI See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA, supra note 7, at 20.
8 See Blatt & Miller, supra note 142, at 236-37. See also Long, supra note 176, at 232-35.
03 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA, supra note 7, at 20.
' Id.
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Finally, considering that patents are more often issued to foreigners
than to local inventors, the majority of inventions patented in ASEAN
countries may be fashioned to the availability of protection afforded in the
inventors' domestic systems and/or of those in conformity with the patent
systems of other developed countries.'85 Consequently, there may be a low
expectation by the public in certain granting ASEAN countries that greater
patent protection would stimulate industrial and technological innovations
that will satisfy local needs.
1 16
As is true in most developing countries, a tradition of consensus
building and concern for the protection of societal good is reflected in the
laws, and presumably the decision making of governing officials, of
Southeast Asian countries. 7 This is likely more acute in Vietnam and other
socialist countries. 88  Less protection may, therefore, be afforded to
individual rights, and limitations may be imposed to guarantee that IPRs
granted under domestic laws contribute to society as a whole.8 9
2. Political Constraints
Ultimately, the enforceability of patents in ASEAN countries may
often be determined by political forces rather than the cultural impediments
considered thus far. In developing countries generally, the lack of political
stability and transparency can potentially limit foreign investment.' 9
Despite an outward willingness to provide the level of IP protection implied
under TRIPs, there may still exist in certain ASEAN countries both direct
and indirect political resistance to uniform global standards.
Opponents to the trend toward harmonization may share a perception
that conformity to international standards entails, in essence, acquiescence
to the demands of developed countries.' 9 ' Such political aversion to uniform
laws can prevent national patent administrations from successfully enforcing
the rights of patentees.
Moreover, the interest in pirate activities may outweigh the national
interests in purging IP violations. 192  The monetary gains that certain
185 See id.
" See id. at 20-21.
Blatt & Miller, supra note 142, at 242.
's' John Gillespie, Private Commercial Rights in Vietnam: A Comparative Analysis, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L.
325, 332-33 (conceding that lack of an ideological commitment in Vietnam to individual rights comes from a
history of neo-Confimcianism prior to the French colonial period as well as that of Marxism).
'8' Blatt & Miller, supra note 142, at 242.
'9 Sarkar, supra note 155, at 724.
"' See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA, supra note 7, at 20.
192 Id.
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governing officials can realize from participation in those covert practices
can foster behaviors that undermine efforts at reform.
On the other hand, political resistance to greater IPRs enforcement
may also be attributable to pre-existing political orders that have not been
entirely receptive to the liberalization of individual commercial rights. In
the case of Vietnam, notwithstanding recent legislation aimed at the
liberalization of commercial laws, the enforceability of private commercial
rights still rests heavily on the authority and discretion of political
authorities. '93
Under the current socialist legal structure, Party officials possess
enormous authority in the legislative and judicial procedures; individuals
have little or no input.'94 Indonesia, a non-socialist corporate economy,
similarly favors a strong central government to oversee the orderly
development of the economy. 95 In any event, the lack of a balance of
power in Vietnam has created a scenario in which the Party's declaration
of observance to national codes has become little more than a meaningless
gesture. 96  The Vietnamese legal framework is thus ridden with
governmental discretion in the control of availability and enforceability of
commercial rights.' 97  In light of widespread political corruption,
favoritism, and lack of economic security inherent within the legal
system,' 9' it is evident that intellectual property rights cannot secure
optimum protection in the absence of an independent system of review in
Vietnam.
In Cambodia, the existence of political despotism clearly supports the
contention that intellectual property rights would be inadequately and
inconsistently enforced. The 1997 coup d'etat underscores the dominance
of political forces over the Cambodian legal framework.'99 Given the blatant
" Gillespie, supra note 188, at 371-72. Despite the introduction into Vietnamese society by French
colonialization of a rights-based law, the private rights afforded individuals within the Vietnamese legal
framework have remained scanty. Id. at 329-33. Rights-based law is identified by legalism under which
individual rights are recognized, as opposed to a legal system of pre-colonial Chinese imperial codes
marked by customary state/individual and inter-family obligations. See id. at 326-33. The inattention to
individual rights has been due in part to a strong history of neo-Confucianism that has been hostile to the
notion of legalism and private commercial rights, and in part to the institution of a socialist legal system by
the Communist Party of Vietnam and its predecessors. Id.
" Id. at 370-71.
195 Id. at 372.
'96 Id. at 337-38.
'97 Id. at 372.
198 Id.
9 For almost two years prior to the coup d'etat, two competing Cambodian political parties, the
Cambodian People's Party ("CPP") led by Hun Sen and the National United Front for an Independent,
Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia ("FUNCINPEC") led by Prince Ranariddh engaged in a
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disregard of the law by political actors illustrated by this recent event, it is
doubtful whether private commercial rights of individuals, let alone IPRs,
can be uniformly and equitably enforced under the current legal framework
in Cambodia.
With the exception of certain countries, such as Malaysia where the
ability to successfully provide substantial protection and enforcement of IPRs
has been attributable to a stable political system and a settled legal regime
originating from English common law,2°° weak IPRs enforcement conditions
can have the effect of obstructing heightened protection in many of the
ASEAN countries. In light of cultural and political norms and attitudes
inherent in existing national legal systems that undermine regulatory and
judiciary efforts to strengthen IP enforcement, ASEAN members should give
serious consideration to the integration of enforcement measures.
D. Unitary Patent Law Enforces Protection
Harmonization of post-grant enforcement procedures under the
framework of a ASEAN Patent Office can ensure the protection of patent
rights in member countries. Such an arrangement will resolve the
limitations imposed by a regional scheme for the administration of patents
lacking in uniform post-grant rights.
In the European context, these limitations rendered the European
Patent Convention less than an ideal regional patent system.2"' The lack of
uniform enforcement measures has created difficulties for patent owners as
well as other parties with interests in the patented product.20 2 For example,
the burden of litigation is substantial. While a patent may be enforced in
one jurisdiction, it can be given little weight in other jurisdictions. Since
patent suits must be pursued in the countries where the infringements occur,
patent owners may at times end up litigating identical issues, in more than
rivalry for power through the build-up of armed forces. Donovan, supra note 177, at 698-99. This rivalry
eventually culminated in an armed battle in late June 1997.
Hun Sen, who justified his use of armed forces as a peace-keeping action in response to Ranariddh's
illegal importation of arms and engagement of military pact with the outlawed Khmer Rouge, Id. at 700,
prevailed in the armed confrontation. Id. at 699. Hun Sen possessed authority over almost all the
Cambodian prosecutorial and judicial corps. However, despite the availability of legal means to pursue
criminal prosecution of his rival, including the liberal democratic constitution, a Law of Organization of the
Courts, and a Penal Code, in the drafting of all of which he participated, Hun Sen resorted to armed means.
Id. at 700. Such a course of action, from Hun Sen's perspective, was appropriate under the traditional
Cambodian notions of governance. Id. His paradoxical behavior can be understood only within the context
of the country's traditional norms and values. Id.
200 Anderson, supra note 168, at 228.
201 Mossinghoff& Kuo, supra note 5, at 537.
202 Id. at 536.
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one jurisdiction." 3 More often than not, infringement litigation becomes an
issue only after parties have invested in the patented product.2°4  The
potential disparate treatment of a patent presents a patent holder with many
uncertainties. Multiple claim interpretations also generate inconsistencies
for the patent owner. °5 Furthermore, fees for national patent maintenance,
on top of costs associated with application fees, translation, and local
representation, is burdensome, and renders application for a EPC patent less
attractive. 2" Considering the deficient legal systems in many of the ASEAN
countries, such limitations would be exacerbated in the case of an ASEAN
Patent Office without uniform enforcement measures.
Realizing the implications which the absence of uniform post-grant
proceedings would present, the members of the European Union ("EU")
established the Community Patent Convention ("CPC") on December 15,
1975, the same time the EPC was formed.2 7 As an effort to eliminate the
drawbacks presented under the EPC, the CPC was to create a community
patent for the EU territory based on a uniform patent law, similar to the
US patent.2 ' The rights accorded a holder of a patent granted under the
CPC would attach and be enforceable with respect to all EU members. 209
A unitary European Patent would eliminate the disparate treatment of
patents and duplicate administrative functions that exist under the EPC,
and allow for efficient employment of personnel and resources.10
Once an ASEAN Patent Office is formed, any attempt to harmonize
post-grant enforcement procedures would accordingly mandate the
institution of a unitary ASEAN patent law applicable to all members of
ASEAN. The issue of whether patents upon the initiatives of applicants
"' Id. at 536-37.
2'4 Id. at 536.
'' Id. at 537.
2% Id.
' Id. The CPC, however, has not been officially implemented. The Convention was intended to
c'onsist exclusively of European Union ("EU") nations and to enter into force three months after the deposit
of the ratification instrument by the last signatory state, which has yet to take place. Id.
'o Id. Under the CPC system, an inventor seeking protection in any part or all of the EU territory
may pursue one of the three choices: 1) submit applications individually in countries where protection is
sought; 2) pursue a patent under the EPC; or 3) acquire a Community patent valid throughout the EU
territory. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA, supra note 7, at 36.
"Id.
2.0 Mossinghoff & Kuo, supra note 5, at 537. In addition to the endeavor of creating a Community
patent under the CPC, there exists only one other unitary regional patent arrangement which replaced pre-
existing national systems: The African Industrial Property Convention ("OAPI"). Id. OAPI is also known
as the Francophone African Patent System. Yu, supra note 9, at 84. See supra note 93 and accompanying
text. An inventor seeking patent protection in any of the fourteen Francophone African countries must do
so through a regional patent registration, though, applications may be filed domestically or directly with the
African Intellectual Property Organization. Mossinghoff& Kuo, supra note 5, at 537
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can still be issued by individual national offices will have to be resolved
by the members. If made available, this alternative may be more
economically sensible to an applicant who wishes to pursue protection in
only one or few countries. Nonetheless, in order for the regional scheme
to be effective, infringement claims would have to be lodged at the central
office. Any administrative and judicial enforcement measures would be
undertaken under the jurisdiction of the ASEAN Patent Office. As a
result, a regional tribunal to handle patent matters would be indispensable.
The regional office would have the authority to impose civil and/or
criminal sanctions where infringement is found. Such enforcement
measures would only be effective if ASEAN members comply with the
orders issued by regional officials. One possible remedy to enforce the
observance of administrative and judicial rulings by member countries is
the threat of economic sanctions enjoined by ASEAN.
E. Barriers To Override
While in theory a unitary ASEAN patent law is ideal for the economic
development of Southeast Asia, the obstacles to overcome before such an
integration of laws can be achieved are far from nominal. it is arguable that
accession to such an arrangement is overwhelmingly a matter of political will;
national governments of ASEAN countries will be obliged to surrender a
certain degree of sovereignty. As established above, in many territories of the
ASEAN region, political corruption is still rampant. The economic incentives
in assenting to a unitary patent law, nevertheless, appear to greatly outweigh
the concessions which national regimes would have to make. Political
resistance is evidently one of the many hurdles to a unitary ASEAN patent law.
A challenge which ASEAN countries would inevitably confront, and
would mandate a compromise among the members is the determination of the
form the legal system which the unitary patent law would assume. The legal
systems of member countries vary significantly-from common law to civil
law systems, and to hybrids of both.21 ' For instance, the Philippines follow the
common law system, and the country's Patent Law of 1947 is essentially
patterned after the patent laws in the United States.212 Similarly, Malaysia's
judicial system is based on the English common law,2 3 and Singapore, upon
"' Deborah A. Haas, Out of Others' Shadows: ASEAN Moves Toward Greater Regional Cooperation
in the Face of the EC and NAFTA, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 809, 862 (1994) (discussing the
impediments to the integration of national laws into a regional legal regime).
212 Jimenez, supra note 25, at 270.
... Anderson, supra note 168, at 186.
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gaining independence from Malaysia in 1965, also drew from the British
jurisprudence.214 Singapore's Patent Act of 1995 is modeled after the UK
Patents Act.215 Conversely, Thailand and Vietnam have code systems.2t 6
Indonesia, on the other hand, is an example of legal pluralism, where multiple
legal systems exist: Islamic law, Dutch influenced national laws, and many
different systems of customary law. 217 It is noteworthy that the Philippines has
recently joined the rest of the ASEAN countries in adopting the universally
recognized first-to-file rule, thereby, further facilitating the harmonization of
patent laws.21 While a uniform legal system is imperative, differences in legal
systems should not be a hindrance to uniform patent enforcement scheme,
hence, a unitary patent law.21 9
In any event, ASEAN must be mindful of the cultural sensitivities and
national sovereignty of member states in pursuit of a unitary patent law. It
must, therefore, ensure that rules and regulations adopted and enforced with
respect to all members are neutral in nature.220
Another issue which provokes considerable concern in patent law,
particularly within the context of regional patent schemes, is the high costs
of procuring a patent within multiple territories world-wide. 22' The total
cost to protect a single invention in fifty-two countries as of 1996 is
approximately $472,000.222 Ukraine, Thailand, Russia, Hungary, and
Indonesia account for $86,000, eighteen percent of the total.223 In light of
the fact that expenses associated with patent application in two of the
ASEAN members has in previous years been egregiously high by
comparison to other countries, an ASEAN Patent Office may remedy the
214 Kang, supra note 85, at 334.
215 Id. at 324.
216 See generally INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA, supra note 7.
217 Donovan, supra note 177, at 701.
218 New Intellectual Property Law Takes Effect in Philippines, supra note 81. Prior to the
implementation of the new legislation, only the Philippines and the United States followed the first-to-
invent rule, under which the first person to invent a product has the presumption of first inventorship. See
Sean T. Camathan, Patent Priority Disputes-A Proposed Re-Definition of "First-to-Invent., " 49 ALA. L.
REV. 755, 757 (1998).
219 The Dutch courts have begun, with the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of
Judgments, to render cross-border enforcement of intellectual property rights in Europe. The courts
rationalized their effort at multi-national enforcement of patents upon the notion of harmonization of laws
implied under the European Patent. Mossinghoff& Kuo, supra note 5, at 533. Thus, an injunction ordered
against an alleged infringer in a foreign court can potentially be enforced by the Dutch court. Id. The
Dutch courts, indeed, found some support from a court in Paris, France, which in one case enforced an
injunction issued against a French defendant by the Hague District Court. Id.
... See Haas, supra note 211, at 863.
221 See Erwin F. Berrier, Global Patent Costs Must be Reduced, 36 IDEA 473 (1996).
222 Franklin Pierce Law Center's Fifth Biennial Patent System Major Problems Conference: Patent
Costs, 36 IDEA 350 (1996).
223 id.
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excessive costs associated with protection acquisition in multiple countries
in Southeast Asia.
It is notable that the growing perception of regional patent offices as
profit making enterprises with the primary interest of generating funds has
halted to some extent support for multi-national patent harmonization.224
Accordingly, fees associated with obtaining an ASEAN patent clearly
should not exceed the aggregate costs of securing patent protection in all
individual national offices of ASEAN countries.
The expenses incurred when applying for patents, however, are not
solely administrative; translation costs constitute a significant share of these
expenses.225 The translation requisite has been greatly criticized as an obstacle
to a European Patent.226 It is also an issue that must be addressed before an
ASEAN Patent Office can be formed. In fact, the language barrier is probably
of greater concern in the ASEAN context because of the diversity in
languages, not to mention the multitude of dialects, spoken in the Southeast
Asian region. ASEAN members may find it frustrating to reach a compromise
on the official language or languages of the regional patent office.
In any event, given the wide usage of English as the preferred language
of business on a global scale,227 as well as within the ASEAN countries, it is
highly advisable that English be employed as the official language. English is
the second most spoken language in the world.228 It is the primary language
used in commerce, daily communication, and government in the Philippines
229
and Singapore.23 In the former, an application for patent must be in English,
or in the national language with its corresponding English translation.23' As to
the latter, English is one of the four official national languages; it is also the
language in which all legislations are written.232 Moreover, English is very
commonly spoken in Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam as well as
other ASEAN countries, and invariably within business circles where
foreigners are participants.233 Since inventors seeking protection in multiple
224 See Michael N. Meller, Costs are Killing Patent Harmonization, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC'Y 211, 221 (1997).
225 Id. at 214.
226 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA, supra note 7, at 37. Under the CPC scheme,
patent applications must be translated into all official languages. Mossinghoff& Kuo, supra note 5, at 537.
227 See Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 429,
n.80 (1997).
228 Meller, supra note 224.
229 Jimenez, supra note 25, at 267.
230 Kang, supra note 85, at 323.
235 Jimenez, supra note 25, at 272.
232 Kang, supra note 85, at 323.
233 See generally INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF EAST ASIA, supra note 7.
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Southeast Asian countries through the ASEAN patent office would necessarily
have to translate applications into the requisite official language(s), hence,
incur enormous costs, the reduction of such expenses with the adoption of
English as the official language could attract more applicants.
VII. CONCLUSION
As the existing regional patent arrangements demonstrate, the
ASEAN members can realize many advantages to the public
administration of patents with the organization of an ASEAN Patent
Office. For most of the members, the ability to provide heightened
protection of patent rights has been severely limited by administrative
deficiencies that exist in the national patent offices. They include
inadequate expertise and funding, and administrative inefficiency
attributable to the misappropriation of funds and poor infrastructure. For
those ASEAN countries, the struggle to conform to international standards
for patent protection will be costly, which may in turn hinder national
efforts to comply with TRIPs. The administrative burdens which the
countries would confront can be extensively reduced with the institution
of a regional patent scheme for the administration of patents.
However, ASEAN members can provide optimum patent protection
only with the adoption of uniform post-grant enforcement procedures
within a unitary patent law. Given the weak enforcement mechanisms for
intellectual property rights in many of the ASEAN countries, the
protection of patents granted through either national offices or the
regional office would be, by international standards implied under TRIPs,
inadequate. ASEAN countries may attempt to strengthen IPRs
enforcement with the promulgation of regulations and reforms to domestic
judicial systems, but cultural and political norms may impede such efforts.
These factors can potentially undermine national reforms to foster an
environment favorable to strict enforcement of IPRs. Consequently,
ASEAN members should strive for the creation of a unitary ASEAN
patent law in connection with the establishment of an ASEAN Patent
Office. Despite the apparent obstacles, the integration of patent systems
can empower ASEAN to fulfill its objective of economic development
stimulation through the enhancement of patent protection.
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